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THE EMBATTLED SOCIAL UTILITIES OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT—A NOAH PRESUMPTION
AND CAUTION AGAINST PUTTING GASMASKS ON THE
CANARIES IN THE COALMINE
By
Zygmunt J.B. Plater*
The militant environmentalist movement in America today is a new
homosocialism, communism. What these people areis against private property
rights. They are trying to attack capitalism and corporate America inthe form
of going after timber companies. And they're trying to say that we must pre
serve these virgin trees because the spotted owl and the rat kangaroo and
whatever livein them,andit's the onlyplace they canlive; the snail darter and
whatever it is.1
L Introduction
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)2—which always seems to be a
lightning rod for politics, passions, and philosophizing—is once again
poised at thebrink ofwhat could become anilluminating national debate.
The Act's congressional reauthorization process is likely to provide the
first mgjor indicator of what the 105th Congress will or won't do to envi
ronmental lawgenerally.3 The competing congressional bills provide a va-
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; LLM. 1974, University of Michigan; J.D.
1968, Yale University; A.B. 1965, Princeton University. This essay is derived from a presenta
tion given at the National Wildlife Federation's National Conference on Habitat Conserva
tion Plans heldin Washington D.C. at Georgetown Law School, May 17 & 18, 1997.1 thank
the conference sponsors for thatoccasion and their hospitality. Matt Aufman, Lance Davis,
and Patrick Nickler, all of the Boston College Law School Class of 1999, provided capable
and much-appreciated last-minute research assistance; Professor William Goldfarb also
made valuable comments.
i Rush Iimbaugh, The Rush Iimbaugh Show, Dec. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Script File.
2 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
3 The ESA has awkwardly awaited reauthorization since the end of 1992, while tenu
ously hanging onto itsappropriations funding year-by-year through continuing resolutions in
Congress. like many other public interest statutes, the ESA includes a sunset provision re
quiring periodic reauthorization statutes, the last one expiring in1992. See Endangered Spe
ciesAct Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, § 1009, 102 Stat. 2306, 2312 (1988). Since
then,the ESAhasbeencontinued through one-year extensions; the most recent temporary
extension wasin 1996. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions andAppropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-159 (1996). This never-ending succession of sunsets is,
needless to say, notapretty picture for those seeking sustained implementation of animpor
tant public interest law. ESA reauthorization islikely to provide the initial barometer read-
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riety of alternatives for strengthening or eroding endangered species
protections. Responding to the property rights movement, the 1982
Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) Amendments to the Act4 offer a case
study in the pressures upon a statutory structure to mutate. In this case,
the Act's standards were shifted (depending upon your viewpoint) from
crudity to fine-tuned sophistication, or from clear enforceable standards
to wishy-washy subjective, politically-variable agency discretion. Ulti
mately, the upcoming national debates on protecting endangered species,
if they are thoughtful, may also serve as an occasion to explore some fun
damental underpinnings of environmental law itself.
From the turbulent past and present of the ESA, this essay offers
some reminders for the impending battles over the Act. It attempts to dis
till some useful lessons from the classic extreme example of the Tenesee
Tellico Dam/snail daiter case,5 and asserts that endangered species pro
tections often fulfill a basic and embattled civic function: the 'canary-in-
the-coalmine' social indicator role. This role adds an important utilitarian
purpose to the Act's ethical and aesthetic benefits, and provides a strate
gic backdrop to the promises and the perils of HCPs.
Below are some interconnected propositions.
• The Endangered Species Act continues to be one of the most em
battled and vulnerable federal environment statutes, besieged by the
dynamic pressures of marketplace politicsand economics, in part be
cause it is primarily justified and explained in limited terms of aes
thetic and ethical social norms, not utilitarian human benefits.
ingon the likely fortunes of subsequent initiatives for andagainst environmental protection
in the 105th Congress. An initial skirmish went for the protectionists: Rep. Richard Pombo
(R-Cal.) and Rep. Walter Herger (R-Cal.) tried to takeadvantage of the spring's tragic flood
disasters by inserting a flood relief bill rider repealing ESA regulation from all projects con
taining any"flood control" purposes. This potentially sweeping override ultimately failed by
a vote of 227 to 196. Flood Prevention and Family Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 478, 105th
Cong. (1997). The Pombo amendment passed by a voicevote on May 7, 1997, but was re
moved the same day by a subsequent roll call vote. 143 Cong. Rec. H2281-2313 (Mav 7
1997).
As this article goes to press there are two major bills proceeding in the 105th Con
gress. One bill, 105 H.R. 2351(proposed July 31, 1997), sponsored by Congressman George
Miller (D-Cal.), is carefully drafted to strengthen the effectiveness of species protection,
witharenewed emphasis onthe goal of recovery of endangered species to sustainable popu
lation levels. For a briefsummary of 105 H.R. 2351, see Daniel Hall, Using Habitat Conser
vation Plans toImplement theEndangered Species Actin Pacific Coast Forests: Common
Problems and Promising Precedents, 27Envtl. L. , n. 171 (1997).
The other bill, 105 S. 1180, sponsored by Senators Dirk Kempthorne (R-Idaho) and
John Chafee (R-R.L), ismuch more industry oriented and seeks to authorize increased prag
matic compromises withhabitat-threatening development projects in order to mitigate the
political pressures on the ESA.
4 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 3760 (1982)
(codified as amended at 16U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)(1994)).
5 The author hadthe mixedhonor of being petitioner andlead counsel in the adminis
trative, judicial, congressional, and God Committee perturbations between the snail darter
and the TVA Tellico Dam project, during the years between 1973 and 1980. See Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA) v. Hill, 437U.S. 153 (1978).
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• If one analyzes endangered species protections—as the God Com
mittee did with the snail darter6—in many, if not all, cases the Act
will be seen to also represent tangible important human social and
economic utilities, relevant even for those who discount moral and
aesthetic reasons for preserving endangered species. The ESA fulfills
an important but little-recognized utilitarian civic function that goes
far beyond aesthetics, ethics, and morals—the strategic social indica
tor function of the canary in the coal mine.
• Amendments for incorporating regulatory balances into the ESA,
like incidental take review and permitting processes, HCPs, and other
second generation proposals for modifying the statutory prohibitions
of the Act, depending on how they are crafted, can incorporate and
secure the important philosophical and practical utilities of the En
dangered Species Act, or eviscerate them.
• Given the array of good but subtle reasons for protecting endan
gered species, public values that are typically not readily marketable
and that provoke a bitter marketplace backlash, we should adopt a
Noah Presumption, a strong presumption in favor of protecting all
endangered species, rather than a dismissive Noah's Choice,7 unless
human necessities clearlyoutweigh the importance of doing so. Nego
tiating narrowly-conceived minimal protections for species is like de
signing gas masks for our canaries, and given the inexorable
pressures of modern administrative politics such gas masks are quite
likely to leak.
II. The ESA: an Environmental Statute with Special Vulnerabilities
All regulation imposes costs on society; we regulate nevertheless de
spite the cost because of countervailing net social benefits. Marketplace
forces, which often are most directly impacted by such regulation,8 natu
rally and forcefully fight back the hardest, using their power and vast re
sourcesto resist the implementation of civicvaluesunprofitable to them.
If net socialbenefits continue to be politicallycredible, however, the regu
latory systems must survive and evolve. Over the past twenty years it is
remarkable how public and private establishments have ultimately ad
justed to most federal environmental statutes.
Today's arguments over habitat conservation plans (HCPs) are part of
a drastic reassessment process being applied, quite uniquely it seems, to
6 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: A Coursebook on
Nature, Law, and Society 659-73 (1992) (retelling the saga of thesnail darter) [hereinafter
Environmental Law and Policy].
7 The term stems from Charles C. Mann & Mark L Plummer, Noah's Choice: The Fu
ture of Endangered Species 1 (1995).
8 Note that "marketplace" forces include federal and state agency players as well as
industry. Asthe history of NEPA illustrates, federal environmental laws typically have been
resisted notonly by private profitmaking enterprises, butalso bya few ormany federal and
state agencies that have established orientations, loyalties, constituencies, and missions that
conflict with the new mandate. The ESA is certainly no exception.
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the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The ESA apparently acts as a special
societal lightning rod,9 with statutory functions and a political setting that
seem to be more subtle, more controversial, and less secure than for other
iragor environmental statutes. Is the ESA so much more embattled than
other federal environmental statutes? Consider the course of modern fed
eral environmental legislation. A noisy parade of statutes marched into
federal law in the 1970s, particularly during the Nixon administration from
1969 to 1974.10 Each of these federal laws was born in controversy and
bitterly resented by the players who were forced to accommodate to the
newly-enforceable civic values the statutes embodied. For most of those
statutes, however, particularly the pollution and toxics laws, the market
has accepted and acUusted to their permanent existence.
With only occasionalexceptions, the marketplace has generally come
to accept the validity and permanence of pollution and toxics laws. The
ongoing evolution of federal environmental statutes reflects a number of
interesting trends: away from command-and-control and design standards
and towards performance standards; away from end-of-the-pipe solutions
and towards prevention, planning, and pre-treatment; away from agency
policing of facilities and towards stakeholder participation, self-certifica
tion, self-auditing, standards of due diligence, and safe harbors. These
trends reflect an ability to adopt market-coordinated approaches because
of the solid, if grudging, market acceptanceof the statutes' basic goalsand
enforcement. The powerful players of the marketplace do not attempt to
overthrow the basic system of protection. A rare exception, where a mar
ket coalition tried to overthrow basic Clean Water Act protections in the
104th Contract of America Congress's House Resolution 961,11 came to
naught when the media woke up to what was dubbed the "Dirty Water
BUT and brought it to public attention.12
The ESA is different. Though ESA proposals echo the trends toward
stakeholder participation, incentives, and the like, they do not seem to
share the same strong premises of accomplishing statutory goals that one
finds in the pollution statutes.13 Only the ESA is still regularlysubjected to
9 See Oliver A. Houck, On the Law ofBiodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81
Minn. L. Rev. 869, 959 n.563 (1997).
10 By my count there were thirty-four significant environmental statutes passed in the
Nixon years, includingthe National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Air Act, Solid Waste
Disposal Act (as amendedby the Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct), Coastal Zone
Management Act,Oil Pollution Act, Federal Water Pollution Control Act (asamended by the
Clean Water Act), Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act, and Toxic Substances
Control Act See Environmental Law and Policy, supra note 6, at 659-73. Only Jimmy
Carter's years come close, with 20 statutes in an equivalent span, many of which were
merely perfecting amendments. Id.
11 H.R. 961, 104thCong. (1995).
12 H.R. 961 waspassed bythe House, 240 to 185, onMay 16,1995, but died in the Senate
when Sen.JohnChafee (R-R.I.) courageously refusedto allow it to proceed. 141 Cong. Rec
D612-01 (May 16, 1995).
13 Note, for example, thedifference between theESA arguments and debates within the
CleanAir Act (CAA) and Clean Water Act (CWA) establishmentsabout Best Available Tech
nology (BAT) versus harm-based standards. The ESA should be so lucky as to be arguing
about direct legal standards set according to criteria that presume the validity of the statu-
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plenary denunciations on the floor of Congress; only the ESA faces serious
non-reauthorization initiatives; only the ESA was hit by a sweeping one-
year listing moratorium.14 It was a high profile ESA case, the spotted owl,
that got hit by the so-called Timber Salvage rider cynically attached to the
Oklahoma bombing relief bill.15 It is the ESA that has sustained amend
ments undermining its fundamental goal, species recovery; and if things go
awry, it is the ESA that could be reamed instead of reinforced by the HCP
strategy.
Why is it that the ESA suffers from this particular precariousness?
There, of course, are many possible distinctions. The institutional setting
for the Act might have some relevance.16 Or it might be that the implemen
tation of the ESA has been particularly heavy-handed or illogical so as to
arouse a particularly persistent market backlash or to prevent the forma
tion of a particularly broad constituency.17 Or the difference might be that
the ESA came to be a federal regulatory regime almost by happenstance.18
tory goals: imagine the protective tone of a process quiring BAT to prevent species jeop
ardy or nonrecovery, or species protection standards set like the CAA's primary and
secondary standards set on a premise of no harm to man or beast
14 Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-Tex.) fronted the successful marketplace campaign
for an ESA moratorium. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for the
Department of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995,Pub. L. 104-
6, Tit z, ch. 4,109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995). The moratorium rescinded $1.5 million of the amounts
formerly available for making threatened or endangered species or critical habitat determi
nations and forbade other funds from being used for these purposes. Id.
15 Pub. L. 104-19, § 2001, 109 Stat. 194 (1995). The same tactic was narrowly avoided
earlier this year when Rep. Richard Pombo (R-Cal.) attempted to attach a rider to the North
west flood relief bill exempting thousands of water-related public works from the ESA. H.R.
478 105th Cong. (1997); 143 Cong. Rec H2283-H2313 (May 7, 1997) (congressional debate
and vote defeating the Pombo Amendment).
16 The EPA has received more money and therefore political support for its regulatory
regimes than the Department of Interior which through its Fish and Wildlife Service imple
ments the ESA, or the Department of Commerce which traditionally finds itself quite reluc
tantly implementing the ESA in the maritime jurisdiction, often in direct conflict with the
Department's eponymous primary mission and constituency.
17 Many ESA opponents point to the infamous case of the snail darter. See TVA v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978). For a lengthier account of the snail darter case, see W.B. Wheeler &
M.J. McDonald, TVA and the Tellico Dam 1936-1979 (1986).
18 Like NEPA, the ESA seems to have been passed as symbolic political rhetoric. As with
the much litigated Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) requirement in section 102 of
NEPA, seen for example in the cases Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (discussing
when a regional EIS as opposed to a project-specific EIS is required) and Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (discussing NEPA's requirement of an
analysis of alternatives in an EIS), the teeth of ESA section 7 and section 9 came as a rude
shock to many, including the industrial and bureaucratic lobbyists whose interests would be
so intimately affected by the Act. It transpired that, lurking within the ESA were two provi
sions that potentially were law, rather than mere good feeling exhortation. Section 7 has a
cause of action lying within its terms on "interagency cooperation" that prohibits federal
agencies from taking any action which jeopardizes the continued existence of a listed spe
cies or modifies or destroys their critical habitats. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994). Section 9
includes a prohibition which makes it "unlawful for any person . . . to . . . take any such
species within the United States or the territorial sea," Id. § 1538 (a)(1)(B). Under the regu
latory definition of "take" confirmed in Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater
Oregon v. Babbitt, 115 S.Ct 2407 (1995), section 9 further prohibits destruction or modifica-
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Or perhaps the Act is considered a more emotive, abstract piece of legisla
tion.19 The original images in the minds of members of Congress, as well
as the public, probably were indeed as Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) said,
protection of "warm ftizzy" creatures against the relatively marginal inter
ests of poachers and merchants trading in violation of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).20
Pollution and toxics statutes have come to be accepted by agencies
and industry, I suspect, primarily because their direct human utility is in
trinsically obvious to public opinion. Behind most of these statutes is the
perceptible reality of direct threats to human health and safety.21 One
doesn't have to understand complex science to know that humans, adults,
children, and babies are directly at risk if the water they drink and bathe
with is contaminated with toxic substances. That fundamental perception
rallies the defense of such statutes when marketplace lobbyists attempt to
nibble or chop away at those regulatory systems.22 The classic false trade
off, a choice between environmental protection and a healthy economy, is
rebutted by media and public recognition of pollution and toxics as vivid
public health hazards, and the machineries of politics and government
have fallen into line.23
tion of habitats far beyond the activities of federal agencies. Id. at 2412. Because of the new
found evolved potency of section 7 and section 9, the procedure for listing a species set out
in section 4 has become extremely important as the gatekeeper for certification of an indi
vidual species as qualified for the protection of section 7 and section 9. 16 U.S.C. § 1533
(1994).
19 Unlike the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, the occupa
tional safety and health statutes, and others like them, the ESA came into existence like
NEPA, as an evocation of a particular political moment, and was thought to personify rather
uncontroversial, generalized, and not specifically enforceable values. See William H. Rod-
gers, Jr., The Seven Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins of Morphology, 27 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1009, 1010 (1994) (stating that the influence of the ESA is often measured in
hope rather than results).
20 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243. CITES has been one of the most
effective international environmental treaties, but it has focused primarily on trade. The
United States extended its range greatly in the ESA. The author heard Senator Baker make
the wry remark at a committee markup in 1977.
21 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2)
(1994) (stating that the disposal of solid and hazardous waste without careful planning "can
present a danger to human health"); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (1994) (stating that
the growth and complexity of air pollution "has resulted in mounting dangers to the public
health and welfare").
22 The defenders of these statutes mobilize and exaggerate those direct threats in order
to protect their regulatory regimes. Note that even when a part of a pollution statute is quite
indirect in its impact on human welfare—as in wetland provisions of §404 of the Clean
Water Act—it is the image of the direct generic threat, e.g. dirty water, that is mobilized to
rally support.
23 Perhaps too much, in the sense that some observers argue the regulation and media
coverage of toxics are harsher than would be justified by the actual public interest involved.
"Although scientific analysis and quantification may have some input into legislative consid
erations of risk reduction strategies, the final statute will usually be influenced more heavily
by subjective and political factors than by objective scientific ones." Harold P. Green, Stand-
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The societal rationale for endangered species conservation, on the
other hand, is generally characterized in terms of philosophy, emotions,
and aesthetics,24 often regarded as heartfelt but not so substantially signif
icant when weighed against the practical world of production, payrolls,
and profits. Occasionally a wistful utilitarian reason for species protection
is trumpeted by ESA defenders—the knowledge or genetic material
gained from endangered species may later turn out to cure cancer—but
such makeweights scarcely dent the dominant mode.
Logic and experience would seem to indicate that a mqjor, if not the
determinative, difference between the broad and deep support for the pol
lution and toxics statutes and seemingly the less deep and less broad sup
port for the ESA lies in perceptions of the particular public values and
purposes the ESAserves. The paradigm images that come to mind for the
Clean Air Act are billowing smoke stacks and gagging, gasping humans;
for the Clean Water Act, pipes discharging gross fluids into waterways,
dead fish and birds belly-up in the scum; for the toxic statutes, workers in
cumbersome space suits cautiously excavating noxious leaking barrels, or
a kitchen faucet with unknown contaminants lurking within. Now con
sider the paradigmatic images of the ESA: the large brown eyes of a baby
seal or tiger or elephant, the fragile finery of an endangered crane, the
brave splashing flukes and quavering underwater songs of humpback
whales.25 These images, though evoking emotional and thereby political
attention, provide fairly shaky support in the host of prosaic battles which
the statute and its regulations must wage each year in the marketplace and
the lobbies of government.26 Withsuch a backdrop it is a wonder that the
Act has survived so long, with most of its teeth intact.
ing Committee Symposium on Risk Assessment: The Role of Congress in Risk Manage
ment, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,220, 10,221 (1983).
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d
(1994), whichlacksthe directimplication of humanharms, nevertheless is given some polit
icalprotectionby the factthat it targets federal agencies anddoes not havedirectregulatory
impacton the private players in the marketplace. Seeid. §§ 4332-4334 (setting forth provi
sions relating to the duties of federal agencies regarding environmental concerns).
24 See 16U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1994) (finding that endangered species have esthetic, eco
logical, historical, recreational, and scientific value).
25 The images whichprovide the broad public inclination of support towardthe Act tend
to be anthropomorphic, grabbing our sense of empathyand identification with the babies
and parenting of endangered animals. The images deal with macrofauna, particularly with
photogenic macrofauna For instance, we seemoreendangered elephants with theirDumbo
storybook ties than of rhinoceroses who do not tend to evoke the same warm or courageous
empathy. Likewise, endangered plants seem to receive little intuitive allegiance from the
contemporary human psyche, redwoods and saguaro cactus to the contrary not with
standing, and endangered bugs and beetles receive even less attention or sympathy.
26 The support for the ESA, of course, cannot merely be capsulated as an emotional
reactionto paradigm images. There is a deeply developed moraland aesthetic argument for
preserving endangered species, and this has always been perceived as laying close to the
essence of the Act. We protect species because to do so is right in a sense of ethics or as a
cultural taste. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1994) (M[T]hese [protected] species of fish,
wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and sci
entific value to the Nation and its people."). My colleague, Steven Kellert, has devised a
catalog of different categories for endangered species, most of whichresonate in the moral
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Tactically, the ESA may be thought to offer the best opening wedge in
the 105th Congress for those forces that tried in the 104th to pull off a
broad-ranging rollback of environmental law. The surmise is that un
doubted broad popular support for the ESA may be relatively shallow, be
cause it appears to be based on less-direct human utilities than the federal
pollution and toxics statutes. So why do we protect endangered species?27
Ethics and morality are surely part of the answer.28 Aesthetic apprecia
tion, in which I would include seeking knowledge for knowledge's sake
alone, is certainly another.29 But obviously, the moral and aesthetic quali
ties do not and should not comprise the entire justification for our soci
ety's protections of endangered species, no matter how good a
juxtaposition of values they may represent. Social utility is a fundamental
function that is fulfilled by all social policy made law.
For a fuller explanation of the reasons for species protection and to
add an especially necessary justification in the practical world of politics,
the ESA is clearly stronger if it is publicly recognized to fulfill significant
utilitarian functions as well.30 The political reality seems to be that
morals and aesthetics are generally rated as less substantial and less so
cially useful than other utilities, particularly direct human health and
safety, and cash. Although there are good, strong moral and aesthetic rea
sons for eliminating pollution of our air, water, and soil, it is the further
utility of direct protection of health and the economy that tends to monop
olize the practical arguments for the development and protection of statu
tory regimes. Hence the earnest attempts of ESA proponents to show
examples of crucial pharmacological substances derived from endangered
species—e.g. taxol from Pacific yew trees shows how species may help
and aesthetic realm. See Stephen R. Kellert, The Value of Life: Biological Diversity and
Human Society 6 (1996) [hereinafter Value of Life].
27 This is, of course, a continuing question in environmental law generally, and endan
gered species protection has always offered a particularly illuminating case in point. See
Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say About
Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute 'Takings"? 80 Iowa L.
Rev. 297 (1995).
28 As noted earlier, Professor Steven Kellert has compiled a catalog of different catego
ries of justifications for endangered species protection, most of which resonate in the moral
and aesthetic realm, "moralistic," "humanistic," "jradiralistic," "aesthetic," and so on, with
only one "utilitarian" category, primarily defined in terms of physical use of individual crea
tures as a resource. Value of Life, supra note 26, at 6.
29 The word aesthetic captures a sense of beauty that humans can feel in beholding an
individual species in a dramatically beautiful natural setting, or more prosaically observing
an endangered species in terms of the artfulness and intricacy of its unique evolved charac
teristics. Scientists may feel a special attachment for a particular creature where their stud
ies produce knowledge of the evolution and intricacy of the individual in its multi
dimensional ecosystem. Knowledge for its own sake is also in these terms an aesthetic
function.
30 Aesthetics, ethics, andmorals canalso, of course, be labeled 'utilitarian' becausethey
reflect concepts that serve to make some people feel happier; or, if endangered species can
be protected and continue in existence without anthropogenic destruction, that serves to
make us see ourselves as good people and our society as a good society. The label utilitarian
is used here, however, to mean the more prosaic, practical, individual or social welfare
utility. ,
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cure cancer.31 These justifications are valid, but seem to be somewhat
leveraged, grasping at straws. The vast majority of endangered species
probably will not cure cancer. Programs for commercially harvesting natu
ral biodiversity in rain forests turn out to be rather insubstantial in their
actual accomplishments.
But utility arguments can be presented far more broadly than merely
noting the physical medicinal use of individual species. The overwhelm
ingly dominant cause of species endangerment is not hunting or trapping
or market harvesting. Rather, it is the alteration and destruction of
habitat.32 Because of the logic of this causation, endangered species often
play an indicator role, serving human utility by identifying and triggering
protections for habitat areas and conditions that hold threatened human
values as well.33 This indicator function focuses on the fact that, by its
very existence in a place, an endangered species serves as a trigger of
legal recognition of that place as rare and potentially endangered for
human purposes, as well as for ecological interests of other flora and
fauna in the ecosystem.34 This was a fundamental role played by species
protection in the spotted owl and snail darter cases: the politically-thank
less functional role played by certain endangered species in identifying
and forcing review of questionable resource development programs and
projects that otherwise would be unlikely to receive meaningful
scrutiny.35
The ESA is a version of the 'canajy^n-the-coal-mine' strategy in the
fact that endangered species in their natural habitats can serve human in
terests in the same way as in the old days when miners carried canaries
with them down into the coal seams. The sensitive little species would
began to show the ill effects of the odorless methane coal gas before
humans could detect the deadly gas, thus warning the miners that there
was serious threat to their health. The canary in this way protected human
health and welfare.36
31 See Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy
1187-88 (2d ed. 1996). I particularly like the example I heard given by Dr. Marc Imlay, a
malachologist who reported that when he was testifying at a House hearing on the ESA, one
of the stolid uninterested members of the committee suddenly sat up and started taking an
avid interest in the Act when it was mentioned that a substance derived from an endangered
shellfish off Key West showed promise in curing genital herpes.
32 Paul R. Ehrlich, The Loss of Diversity; Causes and Consequences, in Biodiversity 21
(E.O. Wilson, ed, 1988).
33 Traditionally, endangered species protection is not viewed as pollution control. It
is, however, in a larger sense, exactly that. Endangered species are useful, though
incomplete, indicators of the health of their ecosystems and of the earth we share.
While the best indicators may often be mollusks, plants, and lower life forms, the
decline of the bald eagle from the effects of chlorinated hydrocarbons is a good indi
cation of the impact of those chemicals on human life. As water quality becomes
inadequate to protect the delta smelt, it will also become inadequate for human uses.
Houck, supra note 27, at 327-28.
M Id.
35 See Stephen L. Yaffee, The Northern Spotted Owl:An Indicator of the Importance of
Sociopolitical Contact, in Endangered Species Recovery 47, 54 (Tim W. Clark et al. eds.,
1994).
56 Houck, supra note 27, at 301 & n.20.
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Like the canaries, an endangered species can show by its presence
that habitat qualities are in jeopardy, with possible or probable human
welfare consequences that may follow. The canary-in-the-coal-mine role is
not necessarily the best, the primary, nor an omnipresent function fulfilled
by the ESA in various cases, but it deserves recognition as a tangible and
systematically important function lying within the logic of endangered
species protection generally, that is at least potentially relevant in every
case. The provisions of the ESA are likely to wax and wane in the current
political gauntlets depending on how the various utilities of species pro
tection are or are not publicly perceived.
III. The ESA in a Classic Case: The Snail Darter and the TVA
Tellico Dam
The utilitarian indicator function of endangered species is even seen
in some of the purportedly most extreme Endangered Species Act (ESA)
cases, including the first nationally notorious ESA case, the conflict be
tween the TVA Tellico Dam and the endangered snail darter.
The snail darter saga was a protracted, many-layered case from the
1970s that, because of its Supreme Court appearance,37 probably lever
aged the modern era of serious ESA implementation. The case affirmed
the strength of the Act's prohibitions and widened the perceived spectrum
of actions requiring ESAcompliance. The case also galvanized an on-going
political reaction against the ESA and it still holds some vivid lessons for
the Act's current evolution.38
A. TheLittle Fish and the Habitat Alteration that Endangered It
The snail darter, Percina tanasi, is a small fish in the perch family,
rarely more than two-and-a-half inches at maturity, highly adapted to feed
ing off small crustaceans, snails, and caddis larvae in the clean rocky sub
strates of shallow rapid-flowing big river habitat in the South East's
piedmont region west of the Appalachians. Its type habitat for feeding and
spawning was the wide shallow shoalwater at Coytee Spring on the Little
Tennessee River, where it was discovered in 1973 by a fish biology class
on a field trip led by an eminent young ichthyologist specializing in
perches, David Etnier of the University of Tennessee.39
As so often happens, the snail darter was an endangered species be
cause of habitat alteration. At one time, scientists presume, it lived widely
in the Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky river systems between the Ap
palachians and the Mississippi. Little by little its populations were extir-
37 SeeTVAv. Hill, 437U.S. 153 (1978).
38 The story is tolda greater length in Wheeler&McDonald, supra note 17. See also,
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Reflected in a River:AgencyAccountability and the TVA Tellico Dam
Case, 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 747, 764-76 (1982); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail
Darter:An EnvironmentalLaw Paradigm and its Consequences, 19U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 805
(1986); Environmental Law and Policy, supra note 6, at 659-73.
39 Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 17, at 184-85.
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pated by thermal changes, pollution, and, most directly, by damming.40
Dams inundate spawning shoals and cover their substrates with silt. By
1973, TVA had built more than sixty dams, turning 2500 linear river miles
in the relatively flat gently-rolling region into sluggish, silted, serpentine
impoundments, leaving only thirty-three undammed river miles of the Lit
tle Tennessee River as the last clean flowing stretch of big river in the
region and its 30,000 snail darters as the last m^jor and then the only
known population of the species.41 The river was a superbly rich ecosys
tem, highly oxygenated, with high alkalinity and richly diverse speciation.
The river valley was likewise extraordinary in human terms, with 360 fam
ily farms on some of richest soils left in the region, unique archeological
and historical features, and great potential for recreation and tourism at
the edge of the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.42
The darters' Little Tennessee River habitat in that last undammed 33
miles was threatened by TVAs final dam project which was a pork-barrel
classic. Since the dam, though small, could not be cost-justified for normal
dam purposes like power, water supply, or flood control because of its
small size and its location as surrounded by other dams,43 the Tellico dam
was built on a novel accounting justification, labeled as another "eco
nomic development demonstration" project.44 The two irayor benefits offi
cially touted were recreation enhancement and resale of shorelands. The
agency would condemn the family farms at low prices and projected that
it would then sell off the land, at a profit, to the Boeing Company, which
would build a model industrial city to be called Timberlake, which might
use the dammed river for barge traffic.45
This program made no common sense, of course,46 and Boeing
quickly bowed out when promised subsidies failed to materialize. But
backed by the congressional pork-barrel appropriations committees, TVA
40 Id.
41 Environmental Law and Policy, supra note 6, at 660-62.
42 Id. The site contained the oldest sites of continuous human habitation in North
America, and also included Cherokee and colonial settlement sites including Echota, the
Cherokees' Jerusalem, and Fort Loudon, a southernmost defensive outpost from the French
and Indian War, and the birthplace of Chief Sequoia. Id. at 660.
43 The dam, because it was in such a flat valley, could backflood thirty-three miles of
river channel with a dam only seventy feet tall, costing $5 million for the dam and $29 mil
lion for levees. The majority of the more than $150 million project costs were land condem
nation and road and bridge construction. General Accounting Office., The Tennessee
Valley Authority's Tellico Dam Project - Costs, Alternatives, and Benefits 7 (Oct. 4,
1977).
44 Environmental Law and Policy, supra note 6, at 660-61.
45 The two classes of claimed benefits that gave the project a positive benefit-cost ratio
were land development profits and increased recreation, neither of which were then, nor
since have proved to be, economically credible. There were no generators in the dam,
though a small amount of power could be generated by diverted flows into a neighboring
dam. Flood control benefits of a small impoundment in the middle of a network of more
than 60 dams were trivial. The desperate internal agency pressures to justify the project are
chronicled in Wheeler & McDonald, supra note 17, at 186-88.
46 See Schultze and E. Gramuch, A Guide to Benefit-Cost Analysis 147-54 (1st ed.
1982) (noting Tellico's limited economic merits).
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implacably continued to push construction on the little dam and the thirty-
three-mile reservoir, and given the agency's dominant powers it would
take something extraordinary to force a commonsense reconsideration of
the threat to the Little Tennessee River ecosystem.
The snail darter proved to be extraordinary. The case started when
Hiram Hill, a student temporarily on leave from law school, took that fish
biology class with Dave Etnier. When he returned to law school and
needed an environmental term paper topic, Hill told his teacher about the
darter and asked whether that would be enough for a ten-page paper. It
was, and then some. Winning the case did not require a great lawyer. The
facts and law were not difficult: if the agency was jeopardizing a listed
species and destroying its habitat, the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court
both said section 7 of the ESA had to be enforced.47 If any acjjustments
were to be made, Congress had to provide the forum for change. This was
the uremand to the legislature" theory borrowed from Professor Sax: if
human necessity conflicted with a statutory prohibition, the matter should
not be resolved by an agency's subjective discretion or by an unelected
judge.48 Courts and agencies should enforce the law, and that in effect
would pass the matter to special resolution in the legislative process. And
so it was.
B. Why Protect the Snail Darter?
During oral argument Justice Powell asked "apart from biological in
terest, which I do not challenge, what purpose is served, if any, by those
little darters? Are they used for food? . . . Are they suitable for bait?"49
Others asked more directly "Aren't you being hypocritical, misusing the
endangered species to fight other battles?"50
47 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), affg 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977); see Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, Statutory Violations and EquitableDiscretion, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 524, 592 n.319, 593
n.322 (1978). The case was broughtby the author, his student, and a colleague, joined later
by an association of biologists and a state chapterof the National Wildlife Federation, sup
ported by severalhundred active citizens, including farmers, Eastern Band Cherokees, fish
ermen, river recreationists, garden clubbers, historians, and environmentalists.
48 See Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment:A Handbook for Citizen Action 175-
92 (1970). "The principle of legislative remand* would have courts leave to Congress the
obligation of declaring its true intent.The roleof courtsis not to make publicpolicy, but to
help assure that public policyis madeby the appropriate entity.'"Brief for Respondents at
149, TVA v. Hill, 437U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701).
49 Record at 43-44, TVA, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (emphasis added).
50 Id.
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There were clearlymoral reasons for saving the darter.51 There were
also aesthetic arguments.52 Butit wasclear to everyone that the ESA was
primarily being given a utilitarian application by the citizen plaintiffs,
and thequestion was whether thatutility was legitimate. The fish was 'be
ing used' bytheplaintiffs. For at least some plaintiffs, thepurpose insuing
on the snail darter's behalf was not primarily for the fish. It was for eco
logical purposes ofsaving a river and itsvalley butnotfor biological pur
poses, and the question was whether the Act should properly be used
beyond the pure objective of saving a creature for its ownsake.
The plaintiffs, answer had to bethatthe ESA serves many social utili
ties, one of which is linked to habitat. The plaintiffs answered that the
snaildarter was a highly sensitive indicator of the habitatqualities which
the citizens were fighting about in the case. A species cannot be
decoupled from its habitat; an endangered species byits very endangered
existence tends to be an important indicator of threatened human values
in its habitat, like a canary in a coalmine.53 So it was logically inevitable
that ESAcases would serve broader functions beyond preservation of par-
si Theethical point is earnestly made, although while miscuing on some facts andmiss
ing the utility arguments, in a published anecdote from an environmental lawyer with a
famous name:
Ona day in early June, Bobby Kennedy Jr. stands overthe body of a decomposing
fox, killed by one of his homemade traps that hadbeen set after the rabid creature
had menaced his children at his home in Mount Kisco,N.Y. Natureis his faith, and he
recounts a conversation he'd had with a Catholic priest on a mountaintop. 'I kind of
challenged him with themost difficult episode inthehistory of environmental advo
cacy, which was thesnail darter case. I said, 'How did we allow this 2-inch fish with
no economic significance to holdup a $1 billion dam project that would have pro
vided energy and jobs to people? Why did we put fish before people?' And he said,
'That's not what happened. We know at our core, as Americans, that if we lose a
single species, welose part ofour ability to sense theDivine, tounderstand who God
is andtherefore whatourpotential is, ashuman beings.' Then I understood that God
reveals himselfthrough manyavenues. When we destroy thosethings, whether whole
species orhuge ecosystems, to me, it'sthe moral equivalent of tearing the lastpages
out of the last Bible on Earth.
John Marks, Special Report: The Return ofthe Kennedys Struggling Against Conservatives
and Cyn^s, A New Generation ofActivists Tries to Assert Itself, U.S. News &World Re
port, Sept 2, 1996, at 42.
52 ft is not so much that the fish is beautiful,though it was to many of its supporters.The
primary aesthetic benefit ofthe darter was probably tothe biologists who marveled atwhat
they learned of its intricate life-cycle migrations, and for whom the remarkable riverine
ecosystem was acontinuing thing ofwonder tobesaved for future generations of scientific
observers. '
53 The indicator species role is a well-known concept in modern conservation biology,
where a species, though notnecessarily an endangered species, acts asanindicator of the
intricacy and dynamic interdependent relationships of an entire ecosystem. Albert C. Lin,
Participants Experiences with Habitat Conservation Planning and Suggestions for
Streamlining the Process, 23 Ecology L. Q. 369, 446 (1996). In ESA litigation, the indicator
role potentially hasadouble function inindicating thehuman interests woven intoitsnature
habitat First it makesimpacted human interests visible andknown (a less significant func
tion in the case of the LittleTennessee RiverValley, because the facts were known by many
in the area at the time). Second, the function of indicating those qualities to the official
cognizance of the legal system. Even where the human interests of an endangered habitat
may beknown, welive inpolitical ecosystems where facts are not necessarily incorporated
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ticular creatures, and that the utility would be less likely to come from the
physical specimens themselves than from their habitats. This is a good
thing, too. Who could believe that an iryimction suit to protect the darter
against a powerful federal agency project could ever have had a hope for
success if there hadn't been a strong human utility argument?
The fundamental point, almost entirely missed by the media coverage
of the snail darter saga, and in most subsequent debates over the ESA, was
that the fish warned us that a costly mistake was about to be made. By its
relict existence in the Little Tennessee River, the fish identified a vanish
ing valuable geographic resource that should not be destroyed without
good reason and the Tellico Dam was not a good reason. It was not just
coincidence that the snail darter was in the path of the last dam, or that
the last dam did not make economic sense, or that absent the fortuitously
strong provisions of the ESA, a stupefyingly stupid project would not have
had to face such substantive legal challenge. The farmers, fishermen, and
environmentalists who loved the Little Tennessee River had tried to show
the extraordinary natural values of the river and valley, the trivial benefits
of the dam project, the true social costs including the loss of farms and the
river, and the economically lucrative and available alternatives.54 As so
often is the case, however, there was no forum for a realistic social ac
counting. The powerful inside players who push such pork projects have
their own internal reasons for ignoring overall rational social economics.
Without some extraordinary forum for citizen outsiders to force an ac
counting, some stupefyingly stupid projects and programs will inexorably
roll on.
After the injunction, the public works lobby led by Sen. Howard
Baker (R-Tenn.)persuaded Congress to create the so called aGod Commit
tee" or aGod Squad"55 which had the power to override the ESA species
protection provisions if an accurate overall economic accounting demon
strated a social necessity to do so.56 The God Committee reviewed the
Tellico Dam under the 1978 ESA amendments and unanimously decided
that in terms of public economics the dam had been a economic non-
starter.57 As Chairman Charles Schultze of the Council of Economic Advi
sors (CEA) asserted tt[t]he interestingphenomenonis that here is a project
that is 95 percent complete and if one takes just the cost of finishing it
into the governance processandthe force of thoughtfullogicis not necessarily implemented
unless there is a legal stick.
54 Building on the citizens' analyses, the God Committee ultimately noted the agricul
tural potential for the valley. Extensive further benefitsto river-based alternative develop
ment were tourism and intensive river use and other recreation coordinated with the
National Park, which draws 10million visits a year. See United States Endangered Species
Committee, Staff Report:Tellico Dam and Reservoir(Jan. 19,1979); General Accounting
Office, TheTennessee Valley Authority'sTellico Dam Project - Costs, Alternatives,and
Benefits (Oct. 14, 1977) (both on file with author).
55 Environmental Lawand Policy, supra note 6, at 659-73.
56 See42 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h) (1994).
57 Environmental Law and Policy, supra note 6, at 659-73.
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against the [total] benefits and does it properly, it doesn't pay, which says
something about the original design!"58
The God Committee issued a dramatic unanimous verdict: in eco
nomic terms endangered species protection still outweighed the merits of
a touted development project.59 A river-based development without the
damcould accomplish far greater economic benefits. The pointdeserves a
further clarification: when the snail darter's God Committee met, it was
told to judge the comparative economics at tlw time of decision, not as
the economics would have been earlier in the project's inception or when
theendangered species conflict was first discovered. The agency had been
pouring money into the project and leveling the forests and farms of the
river valley for 15 years, and the case for species preservation had to ac
cept those sunk costs and lost resources in its economic case to counter
balance the dam. Amazingly, as Chairman Schultze noted, the project still
could not show net human benefits,a dramatic reversal of the classic ecol
ogy versus economics story.60
But the media failed to deliver this dramatic and potentially strategic
affirmation of the economic utility of the ESA into the public forum. The
'fish bites dam' storytypically had run on page one; the God Committee's
vindication of the darter ran deep in the back pages or not at all. The
media's unfulfilled role in this story is significant, as it is in subsequent
ESAstories as well as environmental law generally.The media could have
provided a decisive forum, but the national media never got beyond cari
cature. The press in the snail darter case, as subsequently in the spotted
owl and other noted modern cases, continually cast the story in terms of
endangered species as moral, esthetic and emotional avatars, locked in a
classic trade-off with 'practical' human enterprises. For the press, the
charming infotainment story juxtaposing a frail David versus an institu
tional Goliath is apparently universally irresistible. Story after story fea
tured pictures ofthe little fish beside a 2-inch measure, inset ona photo of
the dam enlarged in wide-angle, anddescribed as a massive hydroelectric
facility. Although this juxtaposition perhaps initially served some interest
ofthe species by casting it inthe biblical hero role, ultimately it replicated
the caricature of a trivial species poised against a powerful and important
market project. The result was a cavalcade ofnews coverage that missed
the dramatic reality ofthe caseand, whatever the reason, it thereby failed
to bring the real merits of the species-project conflict into the political
forum.61
? 58 Charles Schultze, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, Endangered Species Com-
9 mittee, TteUico Dam and Reservoir Project (Jan. 23, 1979) 25-26 (unpubUshed transcript of
' public hearing) (on file with author).
; 59 id.
; eo id.
* 61 why the liberal* media, our government's primary operational information system,
f never delivered the merits of this and other dramatic endangered species cases into the
l political arena isamystery that deserves serious thought. The market realities of"infotain
ment" are probably a part of the reason, including the difficulties of presenting the case's
? complexity and the relative ease and rewards of presenting cliches. Iconoclastic stories
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Andplaying offthe clicheof worthless speciesvs. economic progress,
the marketplace opportunistically sought to rally and capitalize upon a
common sense reaction of public opinion to the alleged "irrational extrem
ism" of protecting the endangered species. The Wall Street Journal, Paul
Harvey, industrial organizations and lobbyists, and a raft of "public inter
est lawfoundations" createdto supportindustry62 successfully built a na
tional perception of the darter case as extreme, and by extension called
into question the social utility of other environmental regulation and per
petuated the classic false tradeoff that we must choose between ecology
and economics. .
The darter'sname was (andstillis) treatedas a twisted icon in popu
lar lore, representing impractical and mindless environmental extremism.
Even voices raised in defense ofthe dartertypically doso only inspiritual,
aesthetic, or moral terms.63 The media, which had so loved the extremist
juxtaposition of little-fish-stops-huge-dam, scarcely covered the story of
the fish's economic vindication in the God Committee, andthat ultimately
allowed the pork-barrel to have the last word.
C. Denouement, Darter, and Dam
In the summer of 1979, in forty-two seconds, in a stealth rider in
serted on the House floor bythe public works appropriations committee,
the ESA was repealed as to Tellico.64 The reservoir was soon completed,
eliminating the darter in its type habitat. Since thenthe reservoir haspro
duced little economicbenefit; the nuyor activityhas been subsidized con
struction of a second-home community. There have been net recreation
losses, a sharp decline inwater quality, nomodel city, nobarge traffic, and
in sum a wasteful loss of a national resource compared to what might
have been. Subsequently, the existence of several other smaller popula
tionsof the darterhave beenestablished, some from transplants and sev
eral in locations potentially liable to toxic pollution, prompting sardonic
comments from ESA critics implying that this and otherspeciesprotection
efforts have been misbegotten.65 The spectes has since been down-listed
to threatened status,66 and hopefully will survive the loss of its rrayor rel-
showing theunconstrained dysfunction of honored establishment institutions like theTVA,
one oftheNew Deal's brightest roses, are depressing. Over thecourse of thesixyears of the
snail darter case I personally spoke to more than 120 reporters, some more than 20 times,
and though I may notbea great press representative, it isnonetheless surprising that there
never was a national media story covering the not so fascinating merits of the conflict.
62 See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 Yale L, J. 1415, 1419-21 (1984).
63 See Marks, supra note 51, at 42.
64 Environmental Law and Policy, supra note6, at 670-72.
65 As former Sen. Robert Packwood (R-Or.) said ofTellico in retrospect in 1990, "[t]he
ultimate irony ofironies, the gate came down, water gurgled up... itisamazing, butthe fish
nowexistsin all of thesestreams that flow intothe reservoir. It hasnot disappeared at all"
136Cong. Rec. S16771-72 (1990).
66 See Final Rule Reclassifying the Snail Darter (Percina Tanasi) from an Endangered
Species toaThreatened Species and Rescinding Critical Habitat Designation, 49 Fed. Reg.
27,510, 27,512 (July 5, 1984) (codified at50 C.F.R. §17.11 (1996)). In downlisting the snail
darter, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) noted that:
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ict population. As aone-sided deprecatory anti-environmental cliche, how
ever the darter seems certain to live long in popular lore as an irrational
extreme, which, as Alexander Bickel used to say, not only misses the
point, but misses the wrong point.
IV. Some Lessons From a Little Fish onthe Promise and Perils of
Amending the ESA
Although the merits of the snail darter case are obviously not the
same in every endangered species controversy,67 the fish has some useful
lessons for the imminent Endangered Species Act (ESA) debates gener
ally, and some in particular for the Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP)
Amendment initiatives.
A. On The Endangered Species Act's Indicator Function
Needless tosay, acontinuing basic lesson isthe need toacknowledge
the indicator role species can play for human welfare. A generic govern
mental failure to integrate the darter's utilitarian indicator function proba
bly explains why the Tellico dam's irrational economics ultimately were
able toroll onover the species. The trigger-indicator social utility function
of the ESA continues to be an important factor in other endangered spe
cies cases e8 If incoming months the basic goals of the ESA are narrowly
[plrior and subsequent to the completion ofthe Tellico Reservoir project, snail darters
were introduced to other streams inthe Tennessee River Valley. To date, these intro
ductions have proven successful only inthe Hiwassee River, Polk County Tennessee.
Snail darters were found inthe Tennessee River, Loudon County, Tennessee, near the
mouth of the Little Tennessee River in 1979. Subsequently, they were discovered in
South Chickamauga Cueek, Hamilton County, Tennessee, in 1980 and later in Catoosa
County Georgia. These discoveries led to additional searches in the Tennessee River
and its tributaries. These searches resulted inthe discovery ofsnail darters inhabiting
three other Tennessee River tributaries (Sewee Creek, Meigs County, Tennessee; Se
quatchie River, Marion County, Tennessee; and Paint Rock River, Jackson and
Madison Counties, Alabama), and the main stem of the Tennessee River near the
mouth oftwo tributaries, South Chickamauga Creek (Nickajack Reservoir, Hamilton
County, Tennessee), and Sequatchie River (Guntersville Reservoir, Marion County,
Tennessee).49 Fed Reg at 27,510. USFWS went on to note that "the snail darter is presently known from
only six Tennessee River tributaries and from the main stem of the Tennessee River near the
mouth of the three tributaries." 49 Fed. Reg. at 27,512.
67 is the snail darter an atypical example of ESA utility? The remarkable economics of
the case where species conservation development alternatives still outweighed the official
development project intangible dollar terms even after millions had been spent on construc
tion is surely not typical. But the spotted owl, the Mt Graham squirrel, pacific salmon,
Barton Springs salamander and aparade ofother species controversies would seem to affirm the same utilitarian indicator role, and enforcement ofthe ESA can encourage alternate
planning and program designs to integrate and accommodate the contending values. Though
the snail darter controversy transpired under ESA section 7, some ofthe lessons from the
darter saga appear directly relevant to HCP issues arising under ESA section 9and section
10 as well68 The northern spotted owl isan endangered species that opened up the merits ofna
tional forest clearcutting not only to public debate, but also to legal mechanisms to force
serious consideration ofthe public interest at stake, ultimately bringing aPresident tothe
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cast merely in terms of biological aesthetics and morality, the Act will be
eroded inthelegislative process andHCPs will bediluted into reductionist
exercises about how many individual animals can feasibly be dealt away
without reaching jeopardy, or about skewed and false tradeoffs.
B. On theRhetoric of theAnalyticalDebate
The national debates on endangered species are not necessarily car
ried on ata high level ofintellect and rhetoric as the keynote quote at the
head of this essay demonstrates,69 but a sophisticated debate has been
developing.70
There is, however, little agreement on goals. Some ofthe arguments
are aimed at intrinsic improvement ofthe ESA, modifications designed to
make the Act serve its internal statutory objectives better, preserving spe
cies and more recently entire ecosystems. Others are predominantly ex
trinsic: the Act must be modified (or repealed) so as to eliminate its
excessive obstruction ofbusiness profits orthe Act must bechanged now
through HCPs to forestall a powerfully anti-conservationist backlash. It
would be naive to ignore the extrinsic arguments, but it is likewise naive
not todistinguish them from intrinsic issues ofprotecting endangered spe
cies. In Noah's Choice, a beautifuUy-written 1995 book,71 ostensibly seeks
to bring a rational societal overview to the field. It surveys many ofthe
scientific delights and philosophical challenges of endangered species
conservation, and advances several major lines of argument. One is that
wegetvery limited tangible benefits from the ESA,72 andthat in effect the
ESA is a practical failure because few species have been successfully re
moved from the endangered list (a conclusion powerfully contested by
Professor Rachlinski).73 Noah's Choice also notes the powerful perverse
incentives the Act gives, especially to private property interests, to subvert
Pacific Northwest to listen and to attempt to negotiate aregime of clear cutting on federalforests that threatened erosion, sedimentation, flooding and the commercial salmon indus
try, as well as the owl in its role as canary. The endangerment of several populations of
ground fish off the New England coast have forced the government and the public to recog
nize and take legal precautions against the extraordinarily destructive fish harvesting meth
ods that have reduced aworld class fishery resource to the edge ofextinction. The Barton
Springs salamander has forced public and private players to acknowledge the negative con
sequences of pumping and contaminating a fossil ground water aquifer as if it was a self-
renewing resource.
69 See Iimbaugh, supra note 1.
7" See the bibliography the United States Fish &Wildlife Service &National Marine
Fisheries Service, Habitat Conservation Planning Handbook App. 2 (1996) [hereinafter
HCP Handbook].
.71 Charles C. Mann &Mark L Plummer, Noah's Choice: The Future of Endangered
Species (1995) [hereinafter Noah's Choice].
72 Id. at 245.
73 Professor Rachlinski powerfully contests Noah's Choice's conclusions-
Although Noah's Choice provides acolorful description ofthe Act's costs, the bookfails to carefully assess its benefits. It portrays an undisciplined program created by a
statute that exaggerates the value that the general public places on biodiversity Unfortunately, Mann and Plummer's case against the Act isbased only on anecdotes and
cursory evaluation ofevidence ofthe Act's benefits.... Ifthe Act's principal impact
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itsprotections. The authors do nottake these as reasons to strengthen the
Act. Rather, afterasserting the lackof success of the ESA and downplay
ingcollateral species protection benefits, they argue that the undoubtedly
substantial cost of species preservation is a fundamental reason to back
down. Their main argument then, as the book's title indicates, is that en
dangered species pose an inescapable loaded choice: If we as a society
want to save species for whatevertheir charms, we wouldhave to ratchet
back living standards and pay trillions of dollars; otherwise we must re
gretfully override endangered species according to whatever may be dic
tated by the marketplace.
It is easy to say that society should extract money from developers
and give it to black-capped vireos that needprotection. Butit is not possi
ble to do this and simultaneously ensure that good housing is available
and affordable to everyone. Or good health care, for that matter, or a good
education. Embracing the goal of saving biodiversity and the goals of pro
viding housing, healthcare, andeducation, as well as the many othergoals
on federal activity is to make it more difficult to undertake wasteful pork barrel
projects like the Tellico Dam, it is surely a welcome addition to the U.S. Code.
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: an Empirical Evaluation of the Endangered
Species Act, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 356, 357, 359 (1997) (book review).
Professor Rachlinski continues, stating:
[although others have criticized their book for failing to propose specific alterna
tives, Mann and Plummer need not offer such proposals. Their mission is accom
plished once they reach the conclusion that the Act has no benefits. Costs without
benefits are not tolerated in contemporary America, nor should they be. Mann and
Plummer do not pronounce final sentenceon the Act, but giventheirverdict,repealis
the most obvious reform.
Id. at 365. Rachlinski then undertakes an extended statistical analysis essentially refuting
the book's no-benefits claim:
In their analysis of whether the Act works, Mann and Plummer commit two critical
errors. First, they fail to determine the Act's marginal impact on biodiversity. Even if
721 more species are endangered today than in 1973, in order to assess the Act's
impact on endangered species, one must ask how many more would have been en
dangered or even extinct if the Act hadneverbecomelaw. Second, their description
of the dataprovidesa snapshotof biodiversity, but their conclusions require a short
video. Data on the present status of species provide little indication of biodiversity
trends. Unfortunately, Mannand Plummer overlook a wealth of data available on the
status of endangered species In its 1994 report... the FWS observedthat 58% of
those specieslisted fortwenty yearsormorehavestableor improving populations, as
opposed to 44% of those species listed for four to twenty years, and 22% of those
species listed for less than four years.
Id. at 366-69. Rachlinski continues:
If the Act remains in its present form, and current trends continue, the status of listed
species can be expected to improve. Ten years hence, the percentage of currently
listed species in declinewill drop fromroughly one-halfto aboutone-third. This bene
ficial trend would likely be furtheredby continuing to designate criticalhabitat and to
develop recovery plans. If all 835 [] specieson the list had both, it can be said that
todayonly roughly one-third wouldbe in decline. If all835 speciesremain on the list
foranotherten yearseachandeachobtainsa recoveryplanandcritical habitat, 81.2%
will be stable or improving.
Id. at 385-86.
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we have taken up during the past two hundred years, makes our choices
difficult... To borrow from Freud, what do we humans want?74
The book, in other words, is seductively written to frame a version of
the classic allegedly unavoidable all or nothing tradeoff between ecology
and economics.
The snail darter reveals Noah's Choice as a false choice. Beyond its
authors' apparent linkage to the Act's industrial opposition,75 doubts
about the book's integrity come from its use of history, including the Tel
lico case. In the book's Chapter 6, "The Awful Beast is Back," the authors
frame the snail darter as a prime example of misuse of the Act, and, signif
icantly, ignore its economicutilityfunction.76 When researching the book,
the authors spoke with me in an extended telephone interview during
which I repeatedly stressed the "canary" function of the darter, the human
economic harms and benefits it had brought to light, and the creative al
ternatives that had emerged from the ESA negotiations. As in hundreds of
other species conflicts, the snail darter case showed that conservation
need not be a draconian choice. One does not have to choose either total
development shutdown to save a species, or total acceptance of whatever
market players desire. Rather the darter showed how even in "extreme"
cases there were opportunities to make adjustments in project timing,
scale, design, and so on, so that human and ecological benefits could both
be maximized by intelligent planning. For Noah's Choice to acknowledge
these strategic aspects of the darter case would have opened the door to
recognizing potential general benefits of species protection that directly
contradicted the book's mission, and so they were ignored. Likewise the
God Committee's economic vindication of the darter's case for species
protection was sidestepped in Noah's Choice.77
Nevertheless, even a balanced analysis of endangered species protec
tion will be forced to address some of the issues raised in Noah's Choice.
The potentially large numbers of listable species make it impossible even
to consider, never mind reverse, every anthropogenic threat of species ex
tinction. As with national health care, implicit or explicit prioritizing and
rationing are anathema yet may inevitably be necessary, though much
thoughtful effort would have to be devoted to that end. Likewise, there
must be systemicrecognitionof a differencebetween private property and
state and federal government lands. The snail darter suit was brought
under section 7 against TVA; it is far easier to justify burdening public
74 Noah's Choice, supra note 71, at 213.
75 The Discovery Institute, abase of operations for oneof the Noah's Choice authors, is
an enigmatic entity with George Gilder as a Senior Fellow and is generally regarded as a
right-wing industry-oriented think tank. The other authoris marriedto a lobbyist for one of
the major industries lobbying against the ESA.
76 Noah's Choice, supra note 71, at 147.
77 Instead of examining the illuminating economic recordof the GodCommittee record
the authors attempt to discredit it with innuendo: "... Secretary of the Interior Cecil An-
drus, chair of the committee, made it clear thatTellico hadnever stooda chance. 'Frankly,'
he said, 'I hate to see the snail darter get the credit for stopping a project that was ill-
conceived and uneconomical in the first place.'" Noah's Choice, supra note 71, at 171.
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agencies with newly-evolving public values. When private lands are bur
dened under section 9, especially when the burdens are severe, the
calculus of fairness and perhaps constitutional due process requires con
sideration of some structure for.negotiated accommodations.78
Hence the current generation of initiatives to consider amendments
to the ESA, which have aroused pitched debates within the environmental
community as well as between it and industry.79 The depth of those de
bates will have to be plumbed elsewhere, but the darter has discrete con
tributions to make in this process, most of the warning variety.
C On the Contending Forces
Beginning with the snail darter, there have been sustained market
place pressures to undercut the legitimacy of species protection in the
agencies, in Congress, and in the press, and that has continued most re
centlywith the feature of the so-called Wise Usepoliticalmovement.80 For
current reauthorization battles, industries have formed a National Endan
gered Species Act Reform Council (NESARC),81 a coalition that continues
the membership of many of the components of the "Project Relief bloc
that tried to turn the 104th Congress into the most dramatic rollback of
environmental protections in the past generation. Given the past as prel
ude, it is altogether likely that the nation will be exposed to a continuing
series of piquant anecdotes about the extreme irrationality of endangered
species protections, like the kangaroo rat that burned a California sub
urb,82 and the legendary caricature of the snail darter. Part of the strategy
of the opposition to the ESAundoubtedly will be to continue the marginal-
ization of the Act's social benefits. If the Act can be characterized as a
shallow emotional impulse to protect photogenic creatures, or a non-tradi
tional religious animysticism, then the Act becomes marginalized in its
terms and justifications. The analysis and rhetoric coming from the Act's
78 See Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the En
dangered Species Act, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 825 (1997).
79 See the interchange between Environmental Defense Fund's Michael Bean and David
Wilcove in The Private Lands Problem, 11 Conservation Biology 1,1 (Feb. 1997) and Doug
las Honnald et al., HCPs and the Protection of Habitat, 11 Conservation Biology 2, 1-4
(Apr. 1997); Sharon Begley&Daniel Glick, The Eye of theStorm: in Today's Environmental
Debates, Newsweek, July 1, 1996, at 59.
80 See Andrea Hungerford, "Custom and Culture" Ordinances: Not a Wise Movefor the
Wise Use Movement, 8 Tul. Envtl. L. J. 457, 458 (1995); see also Ray Vaughan, State of
Extinction: The Case of the Alabama Sturgeon and Ways Opponents of the Endangered
Species Act Thwart Protection for RareSpecies, 46 Ala. L. Rev. 569, 588(1995) ("Themain,
stated goal for the wise use movement is indeed the annihilation of environmental groups
and their influence.'').
81 The NESARC Web site is quite impressive: <http://www.nesarc.org>. NESARC will be
a high-powered playerin the ESA debates with what one suspects is a budget that the fed
eral species protection program would envy.
82 See MichaelE. Soule, Perspective on EndangeredSpecies, L.A.Times, Oct. 25,1995, at
B9 (asserting that ESA-imposed restrictions on habitatmodificationto protect the kangaroo
rat were not responsible for the destruction of many California homes in 1993).
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opponents is likely to track Noah's Choice in circumventing the available
balanced arguments for species protection.
D. On the Media
The snail darter saga demonstrates how intelligent media coverage is
crucial to rational national governance, and rare. Without the sunlight of
intelligent press coverage, insider politics prevail. Tellico shows that it is
not enough that agency administrators and members of Congress know
the factual merits of a controversy. Every member of Congress had been
informed of the Tellico dam's economics before the ultimate vote overrid
ing the snail darter's protections—through extensive briefings and an indi
vidual letter to each member from the God Committee—but they also
knew that America did not know the facts, so pork-barrel politics could
roll on with impunity. To make the legislative process turn on the merits,
they must be known to the public through the press; otherwise our politi
cians will stay with the traditional cynical insider game.
The ESA today still has its media problem. The national press largely
follows the marketplace framing of issues—it's spotted owls versus jobs
and revenues, salamanders versus farmers, kangaroo rats versus subdivi
sions. To the extent that the press does not examine the particulars of
representative cases, nor explore the actual record of HCPs in practice,
the Act will be seriously vulnerable to marketplace attacks.
To the extent that the press fails to discover the logical social utility
role played by species as indicators, the debate will continue to be skewed
toward a trivialization of the Act's social purposes. It would be extremely
useful and interesting for the press to examine in retrospect or in prospect
the social human values represented by endangered species in a number
of classic past cases, or ongoing cases, but the past is sufficiently difficult
and the story sufficiently complex and at variance with conventional wis
dom that such coverage doesn't appear likely anytime soon.
E. On the Promise and Perils of HCPs.
The ESA is currently in the throes of a Delaney Clause-type debate.83
The ESA has been notable, or notorious, for its strict "roadblock" stark
prohibition terms, directly enforceable by citizen lawsuits. ESA section 7
prohibits all federal agency action which threaten listed species, and sec
tion 9 goes even further, prohibiting any act, by anyone, that "takes" a
species, under a definition that includes harms from habitat disruption as
well as direct harm.84 Now, however, like the amended Delaney Clause,85
83 TheDelaney Clause wasenacted in 1958 andabsolutely prohibited the useof anyfood
additives which were found to cause cancer in either humans or animals. 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(c)(3) (1972) (codifiedas amendedat 21U.S.C. § 348(c)(3) (1994)). The absolute prohi
bition of the Delaney Clause is the source of its zero-risk label.
84 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 115 S.Ct. 2407
(1995).
85 OnAugust 3, 1996, President Clinton signed intolawthe Food Quality andProtection
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170,110 Stat. 1489 (1996), which significantly amended both the
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the ESA appears to be in a process of transition away from stark, strict
standards toward more qualified, subjectively-articulated, compromising
standards.
With iragor congressional battles over reauthorization of the ESA im
pending, HCPs have emerged as a focus issue aroimd which the much
larger question is being debated, how, if at all, should the ESA be
changed? HCPs may serve as vehicles for improving and fine-tuning pro
tections for species and ecosystems beyond the first-generation terms of
the current Act, or as a Trojan Horse designed to overthrow the Act's re
markable legal protections. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on goals,
or even on how to ask relevant questions about how well the Act and
HCPs are working, not to mention the almost total lack of basic data about
how HCPs have been implemented in the past fifteen years since the 1982
amendments, particularly over the past four frenetic Clinton years.
Some members of the citizen environmental protection bloc are push
ing ecosystems protection concepts including HCPs forward to broaden
and strengthen the protections of the ESA, which admittedly is too narrow
in its protections. ESA sections 7 and 9 by their terms are focused on only
the most extreme species jeopardy situations. Other environmentalists
seek change to pre-empt a greater market onslaught. Some corporate lob
bies, and the privateer Wise User movement, seek to advance HCPs as a
vehicle to reduce the protective functions of the ESA, circumventing sec
tion 7 and 9, permitting development projects to go forward. Thus, there is
a danger that HCPs will become a Trojan Horse.
Ultimately, the question is how much should be added to or sub
tracted from the current ESA.86 Given the pressures and legitimate needs
of private property, HCPs and other vehicles for section 9 balancing will
inevitably be part of the mix.
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide (FIFRA) and the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Acts (FFDCA). The most important outcome of theses amendments is that the
zero-risk Delaney Clause has been repealed insofar as pesticide residues are concerned and
was replaced with a determination of safety standard of "reasonable certainty that no harm
will result from aggregate exposure." The recent amendments did not comprehensively re
peal the Delaney Clause, but instead removed pesticide residues from its ambit by amending
the FFDCA's definition of food additive to exclude pesticide chemical residues on raw or
processed foods. Thus, the Delaney Clause remains in effect with regard to other food
additives.
86 At the National Wildlife Federation Conference held this past May, Professor Oliver
Houck told a story about a heckler at a lecture of the great scientist Louis Agassiz, who kept
insisting that Agassiz tell the audience not only about the wonders of the planet, but also
what held the planet itself in space. The heckler rejected Agassiz's explanation of orbital
mechanics, so Agassiz asked her what she thought the earth rested upon. She replied that
the earth sits on the back of a big turtle. When Agassiz asked what the turtle would be
standing on, she said "Another turtle. You cannot fool me, Mr. Agassiz. It's turtles all the way
down!" Professor Houck argues that the heckler was right; if you want to save broad ecosys
tems, it's the individual species that must provide the handle—"it's turtles all the way
down."
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In HCP discussions one repeatedly hears a number of what Professor
Houck calls environmental "mantras,"87 each with HCPs as the punchline,
almost all of which deserve critical scrutiny. Each of these mantras con
tains some truth, but note as well the uncertainties and the contentious
political forces lying within them:
• "The ESA focuses on species, not ecosystems. Focusing protection
on the threads when we should be focusing on the tapestries." If it is
true, however, that ecosystems are fiendishly hard to define and regu
late, might not abandonment of the use of individual species as a
practicable legal handle on ecosystems ultimately weaken the protec
tive enterprise?88
• "The ESA comes along with too little too late." This is not necessar
ily a good argument as some imply for doing less or nothing at all.
• "Biodiversity is the fundamental goal to be maintained." Biodivers
ity, however, is extremely difficult to define, and may miss the point:
if an HCP allows a road through a wilderness forest or tundra, it may
actually increase the number of species, but extirpate unique native
indicator species. Thus prevention of extirpation may be a preferable
and contrary goal to diversity per se.
• "Sometimes you have to draw the line: what do you care about,
humans or animals?" This hoary syllogism captures the classic false
tradeoff between ecology and economics, and avoids recognizing ac
commodations and the utilitarian indicator function of species
conservation.
• "Private property is a different animal: what makes sense for fed
eral lands, where aesthetic ecological goals may be okay, doesn't
make sense for private lands." There is undoubtedly a valid distinc
tion here because private property traditionally must absorb some
public value burdens so long as they don't go "too far." And some of
the benefits of species protection, in an impetus to foresight and
sound planning, will sometimes be likewise relevant to private actors.
• "Everything is a trade-off: environmental standards are too drastic,
and must be made flexible, based on administrative discretion, or
market forces will repeal the whole she-bang." The lessons of envi
ronmental legal history, however, are that citizen enforcement of liti-
gatable legal standards is crucially important to achieving statutory
compliance, and delegation of standard-setting and enforcement to
the malleable subjective discretion of agencies is a prescription for
erosion of public values.
87 See Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81
Minn. L. Rev. 869, 959 (1997). This is a superb article that everyone in this field must read
and contend with.
88 As Professor Houck arguedat the NWFConference,Agassiz's heckler was correct: if
you want to identify the most credible support for the world of wildlife protection, "it's
turtles all the way down!" See supra note 86.
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F. On the ESA Utility Presumption for Private and Public Lands
The canary in the coalmine function resonates differently on private
lands than in cases involving government agencies,89 but holds legal rele
vance there as well. As to government agency actions, the social utility
function of endangered species conservation is explicit. The God Commit
tee process of section 7 of the ESA expressly invites consideration of the
utilitarian benefits of development alternatives consistent with species
protection.90 As to incidental take exemptions for federal actions under
section 7,91 the utility balance is only implicit, but unlike petitioners for
section 10 exemptions,92 petitioning agencies under section 7 are presum
ably subject to a full public values balance and do not represent claims
based on private property rights.
What relevance does an endangered species' social utility function
hold for private parties in the section 10 incidental take process? In some
cases, the presence of an endangered species on private lands may tangi
bly serve to benefit private interests by identifying utilitarian concerns.
The Barton Springs salamander may be such a case, where the threat to
the species serves to signal diminishing and contaminated water supplies
necessary for private development, as well as serving to protect public
health.93
But in most cases, and as in the spotted owl controversy, it is likely
that the endangered species social utility indicator function serves public
89 "Government agencies" usuallymeans federal agencies. Note that the political divide
on ESA application is usually drawn between federal and nonfederal lands and actions, with
state-level agency programs usually aligned with private enterprise and the marketplace.
Several recent major timber HCPshave been negotiated with state government agencies, not
private companies. It at least deserves note that state government programs should be re
garded in a different posture from private property interests. State government programs
presumably do not hold the same constitutional regulatory takings claims against the federal
government as private citizens might, and as governmental entities they partake in a,parens
patriae role that internalizes overall social value benefits involved in the regulation in a way
that private property owners do not. State HCPs, therefore, could be expected to give more
to species protection than HCPs negotiated with Corporate interests. Instead it appears that
the strong federal profile on the ESA may act to relieve state entities form their endangered
species conservation functions, freeing them to play more market-oriented entrepreneurial
roles.
90 Two of the criteriathat the God Committee must consider when decidingwhether to
grant an exception are: 1) whether the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits
of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat
and such action is in the public interest, and 2) whether the action is of regional or national
significance. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (1994).
91 Id. § 1536(b).
92 Id. § 1539.
93 DanMuller, The Consequences of Urban Development on BartonSprings and the Ed
wards Aquifer, available at <http://www.sosldf.org/news995.html>. Other possible private
utility examples may include impetuses toward long-term planning in private forestry prac
tices triggered by HCP planning for the red cockaded woodpecker, or the undoubted impor
tance to private fishing interests of fisheries conservation measures triggered by endangered
groundfish populations in the North Atlantic banks. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time
of Counter-Revolution-The Kepone Incident and a Review of First Principles, 29 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 657, 674-77 (1995).
870 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 27:845
rather than private interests. When speciesprotections operate to identify
externalized social costs and socially preferable alternatives, they nor
mally act as a brake on private profit maximization. That is, after all, the
source of most marketplace hostility to the ESA. It would be too much to
expect species protection to regularly serve private entrepreneurial objec
tives as well.
Explicit acknowledgment of the canary function, however, can play a
relevant defensive role when ESA regulatory constraints are legally and
politically weighed against private property. By expanding the breadth of
recognized public values served by species protection beyond ethics and
aesthetics so as to include human utilities, the legitimate scope of such
regulation is enhanced. Today the harms of pollution are widely recog
nized to justify substantial concessions from private enterprise. To the ex
tent that the indicator function of the ESA, albeit less direct, comes to be
seen to identify tangible social harms, to that extent the legitimate scope
of species regulation is reinforced. Acknowledgment of the generic poten
tial of the ESA for social utility can likewise weigh into the balance of HCP
negotiations, in which the values served by species protection sometimes
appear to be politically under reckoned. In this was, endangered species'
natural indicator function illustrates a fundamental and instructive inter
connection between Professor Sax's competing economies: the market
place's short-term consumptive "transformative economy" and "the
economy of nature."94
G. On the Desirability of Negotiation and Agreements
It surely is desirable to try to bring market players and their resources
into serious negotiations about resolving species-development conflicts.
Time and again the darters' advocates sought constructive mediation with
94 Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1433, 1442 (1993). Professor Sax explains:
There are two fundamentally different views of property rights to which I shall refer
as land in the "transformative economy" and land in the "economy of nature." The
conventional perspective of private property, the transformative economy, builds on
the image of property as a discrete entity that can be made one's own by working it
and transforming it into a human artifact. A piece of iron becomes an anvil, a tree
becomes lumber, and a forest becomes a farm. Traditional property law treats unde
veloped land as essentially inert. The land is there, it may have things on or in it (e.g.,
timber or coal), but it is in a passive state, waiting to be put to use. Insofar as land is
"doing" something-for example, harboringwild animals-property law considers such
functions expendable. Indeed, getting rid of the natural, or at least domesticating it,
was a primary task of the European settlers of North America An ecological view of
property, the economy of nature, is fundamentally different. Land is not a passive
entity waiting to be transformed by its landowner. Nor is the world comprised of
distinct tracts of land, separate pieces independent of each other. Rather, an ecologi
cal perspective views land as consisting of systems defined by their function, not by
man-made boundaries. Land is alreadyat work, performing important services in its
unaltered state. For example, forests regulate the global climate, marshes sustain
marine fisheries, and prairie grass holds the soil in place. Transformation diminishes
the functioning of this economy and, in fact, is at odds with it.
Id.
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TVA, but were rebuffed by a leadership understandably determined to
avoid the project's public merits if at all possible. The darter story affirms
that even the allegedly most extreme conflicts are likely to be susceptible
to good faith accommodations and resolution. If TVA had been willing to
modify its initial project plan, a beneficial accommodation between the
ecological imperatives and the Tellico project's avowed objectives could
have been achieved. If there is a strong perception that the ESA will be
enforced, the history of the ESA shows that rational accommodations of
public and private interests can be achieved.
H. On the Need For Clear and Enforceable Standards
The Tellico litigation underscores the absolute necessity of clear stark
standards for statutory enforcement in politically-charged settings, partic
ularly citizen enforcement. The standards for approval of an HCP plan
quite open to subjective variation in implementation, depending upon who
is in charge. When incidental take permits are sought, the harms involved
are almost always "incidental." It is only required that planning "to the
maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such
taking."95 Section 10 is a flexible discretionary call by the Secretary upon
whom political pressures are focused, as are the requirements that the
permitted taking "not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and
recovery of the species in the wild,"96 and "the permit shall contain such
terms and conditions as the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate to
carry out the purposes" of the HCP.97 Note that although these standards
cannot be bent to allow jeopardizing the continued existence of a species
(the Secretary is barred from so doing by Section 7), the standards aban
don the prior (Section 4) goal of affirmative recovery for listed species.
When an HCP is in place it can be enforced by any participant in the
negotiation process through which it was executed. This enforceability
may extend to environmental groups that have been allowed to partici
pate. However, there is no direct enforceability of HCP agreements under
the ESA and the official HCP Handbook expressly suggests that in order to
encourage project promoters to enter into HCPs there should be a clear
exclusion of third party beneficiary claims.98
/. On the Need For Citizen Enforceability
The snail darter vividly illustrated that federal agencies and the mar
ketplace on their own cannot be counted on to enforce the law, even when
the economics of the public interest manifeistly support compliance.99 The
pressures on the official players are too substantial, constant, and intru-
« 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
W Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
97 Id. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(v).
98 See HCP Handbook, supra note 70, at app. 9, Template HCP Implementation Agree
ment § 14.8.
99 At one point an official in the Department of Interior asked me please to sue his de
partment so that they could be freed politically to do what they knew they should.
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sive. Wecannot rely on the old bi-polar paradigm, whereby faithful govern
ment agency watchdogs protect us all from marketplace excesses. The
backstop of citizenenforcementunder ESA section ll,100 as with the pol
lution statutes, has been a vital credibility factor that drives the bureau
cracy's implementation of the law.
It therefore is very troubling that current HCP strategies may tend to
limit citizen enforcement. Citizen enforcement suits require clear statutory
standards, not fuzzy subjective agency discretion, yet terms and proce
dures in the 1982and proposed amendments tend to rely on agency discre
tion. If the Secretary does not choose to see and prosecute violations of
HCPs, judicial deference to agency discretion makes it difficult for citizens
to prosecute. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) itself
expressly proposes that the public not be granted the status of third-party
beneficiaries; this prevents them from enforcing HCP agreements contrac
tually.101 If eligible species are derailed from being listed under the terms
of Candidate Conservation Plans, of which the USFWS is currently so en
amored, citizen enforcement of the plans or ESA provisions is effectively
stymied.102
J. On Avoiding Preemptive Capitulation
At critical moments in the snail darter story agency officials only nar
rowly resisted pressures to undercut the factual record. Ultimately, in
forty-two seconds, the House of Representatives overturned fact and
law.103 Close observers of Washington D.C. are often shocked by the per
emptory volatility of the legislative and regulatory processes, which are so
subject to lobbying pressures that the intrinsic merits of a matter often
seem only accidentally to play any role in its resolution. Powerful extrinsic
pressures can lead to ill-considered, preemptive capitulation, both in the
agency HCP implementation process under the 1982 amendments and in
the ongoing legislative process. There is a real danger that in Washington's
hothouse climate the congressional, executive and citizen defenders of the
societal goals of the ESA will make unnecessary preemptive erosions in
the existing statutory framework.
Has the HCP process been a salutary rational acUustment process to
achieve necessary protections of species while allowing necessary accom
modations with marketplace enterprises, or is it an invitation to low-visi
bility, preemptive capitulation by bureaucrats under pressure? The answer
of course depends in part upon your definitions of the respective necessi
ties and upon how statutory standards are applied and enforced in
practice.
100 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(l)(1994).
101 See HCP Handbook, supra note 70, at app. 9, Template HCP Implementation Agree
ment § 14.8.
102 See 16U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1994). Citizens could theoretically sue the Secretary to force a
listing under section 4, and then sue violators to try to enforce the provisions of section 7 or
section 9, but this would be quixotic.
!03 See supra Part m.C.
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An example of the promise and perils comes from the USFWS's inno
vation of "candidate conservation agreements (CAAs)."104 CCAs are agree
ments made with private and state parties that a species or population will
not be listed by the Department of Interior (DOI) if certain steps are
taken.105 If this occurs well in advance of endangerment, it offers a desira
ble, expanded, early-anticipatory protection of species. If CCAs are em
ployed at the eleventh hour, however, to head-off prepared listings for
species that are already seriously endangered in fact, they operate (per
haps in violation of section 4's listing obligation) to undercut citizen en
forceability which is generally impractical unless species are listed.
Unfortunately there is no consensus on goals, or even on how to ask
relevant questions about how well the Act and HCPs are working, not to
mention the almost total lack of basic data about how HCPs have been
implemented in the past fifteen years since the 1982 amendments, particu
larly over the past four frenetic Clinton years.
As usual, the reality of environmental law turns upon who will do
what under the terms of statutes and regulations, and God is in the details.
It becomes important to review what the actual implementation of HCPs
in the past has been in order to gauge what changes are necessary or ac
ceptable for the future.
K. On the Need For Good Information
Just as the Tellico controversy was hampered by difficulty in getting
biological and economic data—notably an assessment of the attractive
benefits and costs of altering the project to a river-based format to protect
the species—the landscape of the HCP debates is further obstructed by
the lack of anything but selective anecdotal data on what has actually
been going on with HCPs on the ground. We need both good science and
good history.106
It would be useful to know how in practice the Service is interpreting
pivotal phrases in the 1982 HCP amendments—about what measures are
"practicable," and how manytakes "will not appreciably reduce the likeli
hood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild."107
If a federal agency action is linked to a private developer who faces a
potential section 9 take, it can link the project to a federal agencyaction
or permit substantial benefits follow. No HCP is required under the sec-
194 The Departmentof the Interiorannouncedits proposedrules for candidateconserva
tion agreements on June 12, 1997. 62 Fed. Reg. 32,189 (June 12, 1997) (to be codifiedat 50
C.F.R. pts. 13, 17).
105 id.
106 In this area,we must always worry about good science. TVA scientists worked for the
dam building division, with excruciating ethical dilemmas: "Whose bread I eat, his song I
sing" couldbe soundpragmatic advice forbiologists who want their families to eat It some
times takes courage to get importantbut politically unwelcomedatainto the publicrecord.
Like most public interest lawyers, I wouldnever get very far without off-the-record tip-offs
'from insiders with a conscience.
107 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96Stat 3760 (1982)
(codified as amended at 16U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (1994)).
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tion 7(b) incidental take exemption provisions, and the agency also will
usually pick up the tab. It would be useful to know whether accordingly
there has been a tendency to "federalize" incidental takes.108
It would be useful to know what the quality of existing HCPs has
been. Anecdotal experience with one particular HCP, the State of Massa
chusetts' Atlantic Coast PipingPlover HCPseems to be a superb example
of the genre. Its burdens on dune buggies and other coastal economic in
terests are substantial, but accommodations are real. The standards to be
fulfilled are clearly spelled out, citizen enforcement appears feasible, and
the incidental take permit is expressly experimental, lasting only three
years. On the other hand, anecdotal reports indicate that some recent
HCPs are superficial.109 Only one HCP has been challenged in court, the
prototypical San Bruno Mountain Mission Blue Butterfly HCP.110 The San
Bruno HCP survived court review, but its terms and physical conse
quences have been bitterly criticized by local observers.111 Have the Clin
ton HCPs been at least as good as the San Bruno HCP?
108 See Patrick A. Nickler, Research Note, A Tendency toFederalize Incidental Take Ex
emptions: ShiftingPrivate Development Projects From ESA Section10(a) to Section 7, in
Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy, 1997-98 Teacher's Manual
Update 34 (1997); see also Christopher H.M. Carter, Note,A Dual Track for Incidental Tak
ings: Reexamining Sections 7 and 10 of theEndangered SpeciesAct, 19B.C.Envtl. Aff. L.
Rev. 135, 153-54 (1991).
109 What would most of us say about an HCP that would allow private foresters, when
they see an endangeredwoodpecker nesting inside a corporate tree, to search out a similar
tree in a federal forest withintwenty miles, drill a nesting holein the federal tree,wait thirty
days, then cut down the private stand? That would seem like an inappropriate standard,
especially if the private party is a large corporate landowner with thousands of acres of
surrounding woodlands, m reality, the evasions of the Act's stringency's seem to be most
available to the larger private and public-private enterprises that need them least. The at
tackson the spottedowl'sprotections are made in the nameof andbackedby the image of
rugged little guys, tree-cutters, whose jobs wouldactually increasewith the implementation
of selective cutting under owl-protection regimes.
no See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 982-84 (9th Cir.
1985). The court's review seemslargely to have turned on deference to the agency. Severe
criticism of HCPs continues. See Tara Mueller, Habitat Conservation Plans: NotAll They're
Cracked Up to Be, availableat <http://www.humnat.org/epic /HCPfacthtmx
in Enacted in 1982, the San Bruno Mountain HCP has served asa prototype for HCPs.
The plan allowed for limited development on 3600 acres of privatelands which are the sole
known habitatof the Mission Blue butterfly,with landowners agreeing to leave 81% of the
mountain undeveloped. Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 980
(9thCir. 1985). Furthermore, all lotswereburdened with covenants, requiring the ownerto
pay an annual assessment to fund conservation efforts on the mountain. The HCP withstood
judicial scrutiny inFriends ofEndangered Species, 760 F.2d at 984. Other legal challenges to
the San Bruno HCP also have been rejected. See, e.g., W.W. Dean & Associates, 236 Cal.
Rptr. at 17. A thorough survey of some environmentalists' distaste for the HCP is available
from Savannah Blackwell, The Sackof SanBruno, S.F. Bay-Guardian, Dec. 11, 1996, at 1.
Current information is available by mail from San Bruno Mountain Watch, P.O. Box AO,
Brisbane, CA 94005; (415) 467-6631. The information is also available from several on-line
sources, including <http://www.humnat.org/hcp.htm>, <http://www.humnat.org/epic/
HCPfacthtm>, and<http://www.defenders.org>. The environmentalists' arguments aresum
marized as follows:
There was a big problem with the approach, which is that they traded the prime
habitat for the lesser habitat. It was a flawed approach from the start. The concern
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V. Conclusion: A Noah Presumption
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) reauthorization debates present
us in the months ahead with a challenge to craft a process that merges
wise planning and species preservation, avoiding the short term pressures
urging preemptive capitulation. We need wise and enforceable legal stan
dards, procedural and substantive, and the current ESA with its 1982
;Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) amendments falls short of that ideal.
The tone of this article, skeptical of the forces arrayed against species
protection, reflects a warning that withoutgood enforceable fences, HCPs
may make bad neighbors.
The social 'canary-in-the-coalmine' function of the ESA often provides
a compelling utilitarian argument for species protection laws. We must
take care not to risk losing that utilitarian societal function in pragmatic
K compromises that fail. If the ESA is further modified with an insufficient
I and impotent HCP process substituted for the enforceability of section 9,
one of many serious consequences will be the loss of the canary function.
Making narrowly-conceived HCPs is somewhat like designing gas masks
for our canaries. Given the inexorable pressures, unless all HCPs are held| to enforceable high standards, those gas masks are quite likely to leak.
! The assertion of the function of the ESA as an indicator and triggering
f element of legal protection for social policy interests cannot claim that
: that function occurs in the case of every endangered species. There are far
i too many species, and far too many unknowns, to assert a plenary role for| this function, but to do so would also miss the point that protection of
endangered species, like protection of many other social policies, should
not be implemented or abandoned dependent upon its direct payoff in
ft every case. The job of most socially dictated regulations is to implement
* civic values that the market place cannot or will nottake account of. Ifa
\ particularprotection has a tangible payoff, it is likely already to be incor-
! porated within market mechanisms. The existence of the social utility
\ function of endangered species protection, therefore, is best regarded as
1 one more reason, in addition to moral and aesthetic reasons, that society
i
I was that if you tried to get what was the best environmentally that it would seem so| outrageous that the Endangered Species Act would go down in flames ... we should
i have protected the best habitat. You don't give away the best habitat and take some-
i thing marginal and say it works.
; Ellen McGarrahan, TheMission Blue Mission, S.F. Weekly, Aug. 9, 1995(quoting Julie Bott
; of the SierraClub). The San Bruno HCP arose from unique circumstances. San Bruno Moun
tain sits in the middle of a highly developed, suburban area near San Francisco. As a result,
the land was very valuable by the time its development was first proposed in the 1970s, andj itwould have been politically difficult topay the high costs necessary to stop development
I completely. Furthermore, even if no development took place, the Mission Blues on the
# mountain stillwould have faced extinction because normative plants in the area were en-
' croachingon the grasslands on the mountain which form the Mission Blue's criticalhabitat.
1 By enactingthe HCP and allowinglimited development, localofficials avoided the high costs
I associated with nondevelopment, while simultaneously securing perpetual private funding
I for the proactive steps which were needed in any event to preserve the critical habitaton
j the mountain. It is likely that the tradeoffs made in recent HCPs have been far less princi-
i pled than tradeoffs that were made at San Bruno.
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should continue to implement a presumption that endangered species will
be protected and will not be threatened by particular human activities un
less a process of scrupulously careful review shows unavoidable and over
riding human necessity.
